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Industrial Relations Systems In Colonial West Africa--
A Comparative Analysis of French West Africa and the Cold Coa; t
There has been considerable writing in recent years about African
labor, the bulk of it focussed on trade unioraism and in particular, the
political aspects of trade unions. Few studies have appeared, however,
which are concerned with the broader industrial relation, environment
within which African trade unions have operated, and comparative analyses
of African systems of industrial relations are very rare.
The lack of comparative studies is surprising as well as unfortunate,
since one of Africa's continuing sources of interest for social :scientists
is precisely Its potential for study of the process of institutional
Cf. J. Meynaud and A. Salah-Bey, L Syndicalism Africain (Payot, Paris,
1963); Andreas November, L'evolution du mouvenent syndical en Afrique occi-
dental (Mouton, Paris 1965); B.C. Roberts, Labour i n the Tropicul
Territories of the Commonwealth (L.S.E., London, l96); loan Davis,
African Trade Unions (Penguin, Baltimore, 1966); Jack oddis, Afr ica:
The Lion Awakes (London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1961). Useful bibliogra-
phies are: W.H. Friedland, Unions, Labor and Industrial Rclatione
in Africa: An Annotated Bibliography (Cornell, Ithaca, 1Q65); Ai -hur Ross
(editor), Industrial Relations and Economic Development (London, Macmillan,
1966), pp. 325-406, and In particular, pp. 344-56; loan Davis, op. cit.
pp. 233-44.
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The International Labor Organization study, African Labor Surv V (,,cneva,
1958) provides much useful background, but, as Is usually the ease with
surveys of this sort, it is very general in,scope and legalistic in tone.
A recent book by B.C. Roberts and L. Greyfie de Bellecombe, ColI-.t'ive
Bargalnitig in African Countries (London, Macmillan, 1967) is explicitly
comparative in intent, and does contain observations and information of
a comparative kind. While It is a noteworthy first step toward compar a-
tive analysis in this area, It too is quite general, largely descriptive
and based heavily on documents available In Geneva.
2
transfer and social change on a comparative basis. The sources of this
appeal are well known. Into African areas with similar cultural, social
and economic systems were injected a variety of new institutions, including
industrial relations institutions. The study of how these institutions
were adapted to the new environment can tell a great deal about the process
of social change, and about the nature of the colonial relationship as well.
The evaluation of industrial relations institutions is also of interest
to students of comparative industrial relations, especially since studies
of non-Western systems of industrial relations are still very few.
In this paper I will describe and compare some of the main aspects
of industrial relations in British and French colonial territories in West
Africa, using French West Africa and the Gold Coast (now Ghana) as units
of comparison. The focus is on the period before independence, roughly
the years between World War II and the late 1950's. I will try to explain
the nature and sources of the differences in the two areas and will comment
briefly on some longer-term implications of these differences.
Systematic comparative analysis of industrial relations systems is
a complicated task, partly because little usable theory exists to serve
as a general guide to analysis. The most ambitious attempt to generalize
about industrial relations systems is undoubtedly John Dunlop's recent
Comparison of French West Africa and the Gold Coast is not of course the
same as comparison of French and British African colonies in general. Not
only were there large differences within French West Africa, and between
French West Africa and other French colonies in Africa, but the Gold Coast's
system of industrial relations differed in some respects from that which
developed elsewhere in British West Africa, not to speak of East and Central
Africa. Analysis of the French West African and Gold Coast cases nonethe-
less sheds considerable light on the general character of industrial re-
lations in British and French colonial Africa.
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effort. For a variety of reasons, however, his analysis is not much
help in explaining West African industrial relations patterns. The most
suggestive work on national industrial relations systems has been essen-
tially "institutional" in approach, in the sense that it tries to explain
the characteristics of particular industrial relations arrangements by
analysis of the specific historical, political, economic and cultural
factors which have shaped them. In his study of Danish industrial relations,
for example, Walter Galenson stresses the timing of industrialization and
the characteristics of the labor force as key determinants.3 Students of
the U.S. system have emphasized such factors as the heterogeneity of the
labor force, the openness of the society, the favorable labor market con-
ditions, and similar factors as inducing American trade unions to opt,
'John T. Duntop, Industrial Relations Systems, (Harper & Row, New York, 1958).
2 Dunlop is most concerned wit': lassification of factors affecting rulemaking
at the work site; he gives less attention to determinants of national systems
of industrial relations. His discussion of the evolution of industrial re-
lations systems over the course of economic development puts forward a num-
ber of bold generalizations, some of which are relevant to the problems
discussed in this paper. But the usefulness of Dunlop's analysis is reduced
by his emphasison the character of the ruling elite as a major determinant
of the features of an industrial relations system, and especially by a classi-
fication of ruling elites which is not altogether meaningful. In particular,
the fact that most of the industrial relations systems in the less developed
world developed under colonial rule is not adequately taken into account in
his analysis. In Dunlop's later collaborative volume (Industrialism and In-
dustrial Man, was written with C. Kerr, F.H. Harbison, and C.A. Myers) colonial
administrators are elevated into one of the elite categories Into which the
authors put all modernizing groups, and the character of which is made a key
factor in explaining different systems of industrial relations. But this Is
also unsatisfactory. Both French and British West African industrial relations
systems, for example, were shaped by colonial administrators, but their policies
and behavior were very different, and were determined not by their similar
status, but by the different political and ideological contexts within which
they worked, as will be pointed out below.
Walter Galenson, The Danish Sy'stem of Labor Relations: A Study in Industrial
Peace, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1952).
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in their formative years, for collective bargaining and job-oriented
unionism. In combination with the spread of national product and factor
markets, this gave rise to a craft focus, national unions as the basic
unit in the union structure, the concept of exclusive jurisdiction and
other features distinctive in the American system of industrial relations. 1
This same broadly institutional approach will be followed In this
paper. I will try to identify within each of the two West African areas
the economic, political, historical factors that seem to have been most
important in influencing the pattern of development of the industrial rela-
tions systems under colonial rule. For reasons of space and lack of know-
ledge, not all aspects of industrial relations will recrc1 v' ntte-ntion.
Much of what is covered is meant to be exploratory and tlntative, since
so much about the two areas in the colonial period remains obscure.
I. The Characteristics of the Two Industrial Relations Systems2
The major differences between the French West African and Gold Coast
industrial relations systems can be summarized by considering in turn the
1Cf., Lloyd Ulman, The Rise of the National Trade Union: The Development
and Significance of its Structure? Governing Institutions and Economic
Policies, (Harvard University Press, 1955).
2 /
For general background, see the works by Roberts, Roberts and Greyfie de
Bellecombe, and the 1958 I.L.O. African Labor Survey, all cited earlier.
See also, for more details on French West African and Gold Coast labor relations:
E. Berg, "French West Africa", in W. Galenson, (ed.), Labor and Economic De-
velopment, (Wiley, N.Y. , 1959), pp. 186-260; J.I. Roper, Labour Problems
in West Africa, (Penguins, Harmondsworth, 1958); articles in Bulletin of the
Inter-African Labour Institute (London), September and November, 1955, Ja-
nuary, 1960, and #2 of 1963, and the article by Rimmer in Industrial and
Labor Relations Review, January, 1961, pp. 206-226. A good survey of labor
law In French Africa at the end of the colonial period is P.F. Gonidec and
M.Kirsch, Drolt du travail des territoires d'outre-mer, (Paris, 1958).
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trade union movements, the organization of employers, the role of Govern-
ment, the structure of collective bargaining and dispute pattern;.
A. Trade Union Organization
The major differences in trade union organization between the two areas
were: (1) a greater degree of political involvement and ideological con-
cern in French West Africa; (2) less attention in French West Africa to the
development of trade union institutions in the sense onf organizational
machinery and procedures, and less activity at the shop level; (3) a smaller
degree of differentiation in French African trade union structur( along
economic or occupational lines, and a greater degree of cen:ralization of
authority at the territorial level.
1. Politics and Ideology
It is not easy to define and measure the "politicalnesc" or degree of
ideological commitment of a labor movement, and it is even hardcr to com-
pare these qualities.1 All labor organizations have interest in issues beyond
those of bread and butter, and all mix some politics with some job-orien-
ted and institutional (union-building) activity. The reintive importance
of the two components of union activity varies between countries and over
time within countries. It is nonetheless fairly clear that the mix of ac-
tivities contained relatively more politics and ideology in French West
Africa than in the Gold Coast; in the allocation of trade union energy, time
and money, the French African unions gave relatively more attention to larger
social and political issues than did the Gold Coast unions, and relatively
See, for a discussion of some of the semantic and conceptual problems, E.Berg
and J. Butler, "Trade Unions" in J.S. Coleman and C. Rosberg, (eds.), Politi-
cal Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa, (Los Ange les and
Berkeley, 1964)..
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less to job-oriented or union-oriented activities.
One rather intangible indication is to be found in the marked diffe-
rences in the language of trade unionism and trade unionists in the two
areas. Marxist thinking of one shade or another permeated the writing and
speech of French African unionists, as is 'evident in the documentary legacy
of the trade union movement--convention records, constitutions, newspapers,
etc. The mainstream of thinking and writing in the Gold Coast labor move-
ments contains much less in the way of political or sicial philosophy or
concern, and very little of a traditional Marxist flavor in particular.
A firmer clue is the fact that the divisions within the labor movement
in French West Africa were apparently due almost exclusively to political
factors arising either from local political circumstances or from the rival
union situation inherited from France, itself largely ideological in nature.'
In the Gold Coast, political disagreements played a much less important role;
only for a brief period in the early 1950's and again in the year before
independence were they at all significant. Even then the ideological con-
tentwas slight, and in any event the conflict existed almost entirely at
the Trade Union Congress level. Trade union splits did occur in the Gold
Coast but these had their origins for the most part in job-oriented conflicts:
'Throughout the colonial period the unions in French Africa were grouped
into rival centrals attached to the three main French union centrals (the
communist) Confederation Generale du Travail; the (socialist) Confederation
Generale du Travail-Force Ouvriere; the (Christian socialist) Confederation
Francaise des Travailleurs Chretiens).
2
In 1953, there were two central labor organlzations, divided on the overt
issue of International affilitation. Also at Issue were differences in
trade union willingness to associate with the Convention People's Party.
(See E. Berg and J. Butler, op. cit., for a brief discussion.)
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differences between blue and white collar groups, for example, or dissa-
tisfaction of a particular craft inside a larger industrial union. Thus
in the 1950's, first railway engineers and then maritime workers seceded
from the railway union because they felt the railway clerks were running
the union and that their particular interests were not being taken ito
account, There were also some breakaways that reflected ethnic particular-
ism or regional conflicts.' There appear to have been no comparable sources
of internal division within the French West African unions, though too little
is known about the history of trade unionism in that area to be certain.
2. Union Structure
In the evolution of every trade union movement, two related sets of
structural questions arise. The first involves the form of organization
to be adopted. Should an electrician working for the XYZ Construction
Company join with other electricians working in his and other enterprises
in an electricians' union (a craft union); with all other employees of
the XYZ Company to form an XYZ employees' union (a "house" or "company"
union); with all other employees of the XYZ Company and employees of
other enterprises in the construction industry to form a construction
workers' union (industrial union); or, finally, with all other workers
in his locality or industry, in a geographically-based union?
The second question, implicit in the f;rst, relates to the distri-
bution of functions and power among the various layers of union structure.
How is authority within the labor movement to be divided among local
unions, national unions, intermediate bodies, and the central confederation?
See below, p. 32
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Between French West Africa and the Gold Coast some fundamental dif-
ferences arose in these structural matters. According to the theoretical
blueprint of union structure in the French-speaking areas, workers were
organized in Syndicats Professionels, occupational unions most often in-
dustrial in scope; the electricians in XYZ Company in Dakar would be or-
ganized with all other XYZ workers in an XYZ Company Section Syndicale,
a local unit of the Construction Workers' Union of Dakar. The structure
then rose horizontally (geographically) as well as vertically (occupation-
ally). The Construction Workers' Union of Dakar joined with all other
Dakar unions in a kind of city central or district council--a Union Locale
or Regionale, thich vas grouped with other Union Locales on the national
level into a Territorial Federation--a Union Territoriale (after inde-
pendence Union Nationale). The Construction Workers' Union of Dakar
would also be grouped with construction workers in other parts of Senegal
in a Construction Worker's Union of Senegal.
The key organizational unit, where true authority and sovereignty
in the labor movement resided, was the geographical federationh the Union
Territoriale. The "house" (or enterprise-level) unions never had much
vitality. An all-French West Africa-wide organization came into being
after 1951, but was mainly a coordinating body with little authority. In-
dustrial unions, except nong teachers and railwaymen, existed more on paper
than in reality, though after 1956 they assumed a somewhat more important
role in negotiations. Throughout most of the history of the labor movement
in French-speaking Africa, the territorial (national) federations handled
grievances for all workers, bargained on most important questions, and de--
cided the major strikes as well as led them.
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In the Gold Coast, a different structure emerged. The basic unit
became the "house" or company-wide union. Industrial unions developed
in mines and railways and in a few other sectors, as in French West
Africa. But most unions were limited in scope to a single company. The
Trades Unions Congress which existed at the top before independence was
a relatively powerless body, with little money, few full-time staff workers
and limited control over the constituent unions. Authority in the labor
movement of the Gold Coast thus tended to be more decentralized than
in French-speaking Africa, and the geographical bodies so important in
the French West African union structure had no counterpart there.
3. Institution-Building and Shop-Level Activity
As might be expected from the relatively greater political commitment
and the structure of the labor movement, the French West African unions
were less concerned than Gold Coast unions with organizational matters,
with improving the union's institutional position, with procedures and
administrative machinery. And, related to this, the French African unions
had less presence at the shop or office level, though in neither area
did the labor organizations have much of a hold among the rank and file.
There are a number of indicators of these differences.
(a) In French West African trade union affairs of the period there
seems to have been very little preoccupation with matters relating to
internal union machinery; neither trade union adminstration nor structural
problems were much discussed at conventions, except occasionally and when
they bore on broader political issues.A Among unions of comparable strength
1
At the UGTAN (ge~neral Union of African Workers) Convention in Conakry in Jan-
uary 1959, for example, there was considerable discussion of "corporatism"--that
is, tendencies toward job-oriented union positions as opposed to "revolutionary"
unionism. But this apparent discussion over union structure was simply the overt
manifestation of basic political differences which could not prudently be
discussed openly.
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in the two areas, the internal administrative machinery was more developed
in the Gold Coast--committee structure and branch organizations were more
articulated, for example, in the Gold Coast Mineworkers' Union or railway-
men's organizations, than in the mining or railway unions in French West
Africa. No one who sat through union conferences in the two areas during
the colonial period could fail to be impressed by these differences: the
French African union discussions were general, highly colored with Marxist
rhetoric, almost without reference to the humdrum details of running a un-
ion organization. In the Gold Coast there was a laborious concern with pro-
cedural matters and organizational affairs; conventions were heavy with com-
mittee reports on job-oriented questions, sub-committee reports, arduously-
compiled financial statements, and--for a union like the Mineworkers--long
discussion of Branch-Headquarters relationships.1
(b) The most direct impact of unions on workers is normally
in the area of grievance handling. The French African unions played a
significantly smaller role with respect to grievances than did the Gold
Coast unions. There was very little formal grievance machinery in either
place but consultation and negotiation machinery at the shop or office level
was more frequent in the Gold Coast. In the bigger private firms and govern-
ment departments there was a fairly well developed system of joint consulta-
tions.2 During these sessions, extensive discussions took place concerning
minor wage matters and working conditions within the firm, and local union
representatives had a chance to discuss worksite problems and grievances with
1fReport of the 14th Annual Convention, Gold Coast Mineworkers' Union,
Tarkwa, 1958, (mimeographed).
2 In 1953-54, for example, some 47 such committees were functioning in pri-
vate enterprises and 125 in public services. (Gold Coast, Annual Report of
the Labor Department, 1953-4).
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employer representatives. Similar opportunities were rare in French Africa.
Individual grievances there were almost invariably handled by the represen-
tatives of the trade union central, not the local representatives. At the
local level, the labor law provided (as in France) for the election of workers'
/ }/
delegates (delegues de personnel), who were to act as spokesmen on grie-
vances. Although the unions usually put forward slates at these elections,
and so were represented in this sense at the local level, there was an ambi-
guity in the relationship between workers' delegates and trade unions which
did not exist in the Gold Coast. It is not clear, in any event, that the
worker delegate system functioned satisfactorily--though very little is
known about how they worked in practice. The opinion of the French Labor
Inspectorate officials in the early and mid-fifties were generally negative
1
on their performance. The fact that workers so frequently went directly
1The system of workers' delegates was introduced into French West Africa in
1937, by the decree on collective agreements of March 20, 1937. According
to the Labor Inspector in the Ivory Coast in 1948, the system functioned
poorly:
"...often the delegate is an old man, most of the time illiterate,
who (the workers) push forward to take on a thankless job in every way
similar to that done by the village chief vis-a-vis the administration.
The favor that these representatives enjoy with their comrades is nil;
that...which they enjoy with employers is largely fictitious, a fiction
which is carefully maintained by the employers however...." (Inspection
Territoriale du Travail de la Cote d'Ivoire, Rapport Annuel, 1948,
cited in Inspection Generale du Travail de l'AOF, Rapport Annuel, 1949,
p. 59.)
In the Sudan, (now Mali) it did not seem much better. "The workers
have not generally profited from these provisions (on workers' delegates)
because they are either union members and do not therefore understand
the need of having, alongside their unions, a permanent representative...,
or because they are not union members and any typeeof organization is
not of interest to them.." (Inspection Generale du Travail de l'AOF,
Rapr nul 99 p.* 59).
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to the Bourse du Travail and to the permanent representatives of the union
central located there, suggests that it did not work very well.
Equally little is known about the actual functioning during these years
of one other shop-level institution: the joint classification committees,
provision for which was included in collective agreements. These committees,
composed of worker and employer representatives, were intended to resolve
grievances related to job grading. Whether their creation significantly
lessened the flow of classification grievances to the labor courts is not known.
The presence of labor courts, and the absence of comparable institutions
in the Gold Coast, further contributed to the dilution of a trade union pre-
sence at the shop-level in French Africa. Not only was there in the French
West African system less face-to-face discussion between unions and employers
about local issues and grievances, but these issues were less frequently
settled directly by the parties.'
(c) Accounting and financial problems absorbed far less leadership
energy in French West Africa than in the Gold Coast. The Gold Coast unions
operated on locally-raised dues revenues to a greater extent and were much
more concerned with financial reporting, both within the labor movement,
and between the unions and the Government. The French West African unions
could exist without much dues income, thanks to provision by municipalities
of office space in a Bourse du Travail , and the French administration prac-
tice of allowing civil servants to be "detached" with pay for union duties.
(d) Broader efforts at rank and file education were made in the Gold
Coast. Soon after the formation of the first university, in the late 1940's
1
Mediation and conciliation by labor officers was general in both systems,
however.
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an Extra-Mural Department was set up, which sent out trade union tutors through-
out the 1950's and held frequent in-service training courses for trade union-
ists . In 1953 the Trades Union Congress, with the help of the British TUC
and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, set up a Workers'
Education Association, which was supposed to do rank-and-file education,
though what it actually did is obscure. In French Africa, the only union
education efforts were those that took union leaders abroad, though the Christ-
ian unions in Senegal did set up some courses in the late 1950's. This seems
to have been the only effort of its kind in all of French West Africa before
Independence.
B. The Organization of Employers
Differences in trade union organization were matched by differences
in employer organization in the two areas. In French Africa almost all em-
ployers were members of an industry-based trade association; there were over
120 such associations in French West Africa in the early 1950's. Through
their trade association most employers belonged to one of the two major
groups which did most bargaining for employers: an organization of employers
in manufacturing and construction (UNISYNDI, Union Syndical des Industriels),
and an organization of employers in trade, commerce and services (SCIMPEX,
Syndical des Commercents Importateurs et Exportateurs). (Where there were
expatriate planters, as in Guinea and the Ivory Coast, they had their own
organizations.) Each of the two major employer associations maintained an
office with paid staff in each of the territories, In Dakar, and in Paris.
Finally, overseas employers formed a special section in the French Employers
Association (CNPF, CoieNtoa uParntFagi)
14
In Ghana employer organization was much sketchier. The big mining
companies, with one major exception, were members of the Chamber of Mines,
which bargained for its members over wages and had a joint policy on con-
ditions of service. There were a variety of trade associations and numerous
chn-her nF commerce. But there was no joint bargaining other than in the
mining industry. The Ghana Employers' Association, composed of most of the
important British enterprises, was a poorly-financed, loosely-organized
group, which played no significant role in collective bargaining. Some em-
ployers in commercial enterprises attempted late in the colonial period to
organize along racial lines: the Indian Merchants Association, the Syrian
Merchants Association, etc. But when in 1958 these associations were urged
to bargain collectively with a newly-formed Union of Distributive Retail
and Allied Workers, they were unable to do so effectively. British-based
firms had relations with the British Overseas Employers' Federation, but
the links were less formal and less continuous than were those that tied
the French overseas employers to the French Employers' Association.
C. The Role of Government
In both areas government wage decisions were the major determinants
of the general level of wages and the wage structure. In the Gold Coast,
Government influenced general movements in wages through its position as
employer of over half the non-agricultural labor force. Private sector wage
changes tended to follow those of Government, but there were substitial
variations between firms and industries, and the whole process of private
sector wage determination was decentralized. There was, for example, no
statutory minimum wage until after Independence. Decisions about non-wage
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conditions of employment were also decentralized and varied fairly widely
from firm to firm. They were either negotiated between employers and unions
(notably in the mining industry and the United Africa Company, where relatively
strong unions existed) or were decided upon unilaterally be employers, where
unions were weak or absent. The scope for determination of these conditions
by the parties was relatively large, since the law was not extensive on
these matters.
In French Africa, it was otherwise. There was first of all a statutory
minimum wage (salaire minimum interprofessionelle garanti, or SMIG), which
affected privately as well as publicly employed workers, and which became
the effective rate for unskilled labor throughout the territory. Further-
more, the change in the SMIG was the basis of discussion for changes in the
wages of skilled workers. And finally, the scope of bargaining was highly
restricted; all the basic conditions of employment were set down by law--
overtime rates, vacations, etc. The law also prescribed the form of collec.
tive contracts, including directives as to what had to be included in the
agreement. The government role in the negotiation of collective agreements
was more direct than in the Gold Coast, since agreements were negotiated
in the presence of government officials, and these could be "extended" to
cover entire industries, thereby acquiring the force of law.
1
Cf., Report of the Ghana Employers' Association on Terms and Conditions of
Service, 1957. See also, Roberts and Grefie de Bellecombe, Ch. 5.
2 Much has been made of this particular characteristic of the French African
bargaining system by outside observers, who suggest that it made collective
bargaining in the French areas more an administrative arrangement than true
bargaining. (See: P.F. Gonidec and M. Kirsch, Droit du travail des terrn-
toires d'outre-mer, (Paris, 1958), p. 143; and Roberts and de Bellecombe,
p. 63 ff.)
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The colonial governments In French West Africa intervened more inten-
sively and directly in the procedures of collective bargaining, but not in
all respects. With respect to wages, bargaining procedures were more or less
the same in all the territories of French West Africa. There e:-isted in each
territory a tri-partite (Government, Employers, Unions) Labor Advisory Com-
mittee (Commission Consultative du Travail), TWhose main, almost exclusive
function was to discuss changes in the SMIG. The "bargaining" procedure
consisted of the two parties presenting the Government representative with
conflicting claims as to how much the cost of living had gone up since the
last SMIG revision; in states other than Senegal, demands also focussed
on closing the gap between the SMIG in Senegal and other states. More mean-
ingful wage bargaining took place when it came time to discuss the wages of
graded workers--that is, those in skill categories above that of unskilled
laborers. These discussions took place in tripartite territorial Joint
Councils (commissions mixtes), also under the chairmanship of a government
official. In these councils, collective agreements were worked out. In the
French areas, therefore, the procedures of wage determination, and collective
bargaining in general, were highly structured.
In the Gold Coast the instrument of wage changes in the public sector
was the wage or salary commission, a body of experts, usually chaired by an
expatriate called in from Britain. The major wage changes after World War II
were based on the recommendations emanating from such commissions: the Harri-
gan Commission in 1946, Korsah in 1947, Lidbury and Gbedemah in 1951 and
I1n periods of price stability, as in the mid-50's, bargaining revolved around
arguments as to what was "suitable" to include In the "minimum subsistence
budget" (budgtdu minimum vital), the composition and cost of which was the
peg around which all discussions over wages took place.
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1952, Waugh in 1957. Between commission reports, bargaining took place
mainly with respect to cost of living adjustments; public sector unions
demanded, and generally won, cost-of-living allowances. But what usually
happened was that between commission reports,"anomalies" in the wage structure
and dissatisfaction with cost of living allowances led to an accumulation
of grievances; the consequent pressures were temporarily dealt with by the
succeeding salaries commission.
Bargaining over wages and conditions of employment in the private sector
almost invariably involved demands by unions that employers meet government
rates or conditions. Changes in the general level and structure of wages
of privately-employed workers did tend to follow government changes, though
larger enterprises retained considerable flexibility. Each time a salaries
commission was appointed to recommend changes in government wages, the private
sector held its breath. When the commission issued its report there was
a flurry of negotiation (and strikes) to decide how much of it would be
applied to private firms. The important point is that Government's role
in determining private sector wages and conditions, either through direct
wage regulation or by legislation, was far less significant than in French
Africa.
Colonial administrations in French Africa were not uniformly more "inter-
ventionist" in industrial relations matters than the British administration
in the Gold Coast. In several respects the roles were reversed. Thus, in
matters of political activity, French administrations generally took a more
permissive line toward the trade unions. In 1949-50, when there were a
number of serious "incidents" in the Ivory Coast and Upper Volta, the authori-
ties in those territories did move to supress overtly political acts by the
17
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trade unions. But the normal response of the colonial administrators was
to play the political game themselves, manipulating (where they could) trade
unions as they tried to manipulate political parties and other groups. There
was certainly much less lecturing by French government officials on the
virtues of "non-political" trade unionism, as compared with that by British
officials in the Gold Coast.
Related to this was the policy stance regarding the scope of activity
allowed to civil servant organizations. In the Gold Coast, as throughout
British Africa, civil servants had particular restrictions put on them,
especially insofar as their activities touched political nerves. In French
West Africa this was decidedly less of a concern, and trade union activities
among civil servants were subject to fewer constraints.
Finally, the Britishcwere a good deal tougher about accounting practices
than were the French. In the Gold Coast, trade unions were required by law
to register with the Registrar of Trade Unions and to submit annual reports
on membership and finances. Proper reporting and accounting was taken serious-
ly by the Registrar of Trade Unions, who subjected the unions to a continu-
ous flow of nagging letters and complaints about inadequate financial accounting.
The French West African unions were not exposed to the same controls.
It is true that in the beginning years formal regulation by law was more
extensive than in the Gold Coast. In the latter country, for example, the
Trade Union Ordinance which appeared just before World War II required re-
gistration and financial accounting as a precondition for union recognition.
In French Africa the 1937 legislation which authorized unions, had accounting
regulations, educational qualifications for membership and leadership, and
prohibition of political discussion by some of the new associations of wage
19
earners. In 1944, most of these restrictions were swept away. Between
1944 and 1952 there existed a peculiar legal situation in labor matters;
it was not clear which laws applied to Africa and which did not. African
trade unionists claimed that the French Constitution was applicable in
certain matters of African labor law. They therefore refused to comply
with unfavorable legal provisions supposedly in force in French West Africa. 1
Thus, the registration and accounting provisions of the 1937 law on trade
unions were ignored after 1944, and the unions sent in no reports. In the
Labor Code of 1952, the omnibus labor law which governed industrial relations
until independence, no provision was made for registration and regulation
of financial practices.
D. The Nature and Structure of Collective Bargaining
As has already been suggested in the discussion of wage determination
above, the structure of bargaining--like the union and employer organizations
themselves--was more centralized in French West Africa than in the Gold
Coast. In the Gold Coast, typical negotiations took place between the
management of a given plant or company and the employees of that company.
In some of the bigger firms bargaining was on an establishment rather than
on enterprise-wide basis; the United Africa Company Employees' Union, for
example, did not negotiate for all the employees of the UAC in the Gold
Coast, since important subsidiary companies had their own unions. In a
few cases, bargaining took place along "craft" lines, though this was rare;
the main example was in the railways, where the skilled locomotive engineers
1Until 1952, for example, a complicated procedure of compulsory conciliation
was theoretically in force, and any strike occurring before this procedure
had been exhausted was "illegal". In fact, this old law was ignored by Af-
rican trade unions, most strikes occurred "unlawfully", and the law was not
really applied.
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had their own union and negotiated separately. In some cases, too, there
were approaches to industry.wide bargaining. The most important example was
in the mining industry, where the Mines Employees' Union and the Chamber of
Mines bargained for most mines and companies. The African Manganese Company,
however, which employed approximately twenty per cent of the mineworkers in
the country, was not a member of the Chamber of Mines and bargained directly
with the union.
Bargaining arrangements as they existed in FWA are less easy to summa-
rize quickly, especially for those accustomed to the Anglo-Saxon trade union
tradition. What especially complicates matters is that major changes occurred
after 1956, due to the application of new labor legislation. The only
name that would seem to fit the FWA bargaining structure before 1956 is
"regional bargaining". In each of the territories, union and management re-
presentatives selected by the government met with government representatives
in the territorial Joint Councils (commissions mixtes), where, as noted
above, they worked out long collective agreements covering large blocks
of workers. In some territories there was one basic agreement covering all
African workers; this was the case in Senegal and Dahomey. In other terri-
tories there were two agreements for African workers--one for all manual
workers, the other covering all office workers. Expatriate European workers
were covered by separate agreements.
These general collective agreements covered wages for all graded labor,
and almost all conditions of work-hours of work, overtime payments, leave
arrangements, etc. Some of the particulars of the contract were 1ift open
for negotiations by local employers' groups and unions--generally meeting
on an industry-wide basis. Because so much of the substance of the agreement
was covered by law or was specified in the territory-wide agreement, the
21
scope of discussions on what can be called "local conditions" seems to have
been relatively small. The general agreements could be, and were, given
1
legal status by government extension, as noted earlier.
That these arrangements involved more centralized decision-making in
the French African areas is clear. The key wage decisions were made on the
territorial level, when changes in the statutory minimum (SMIG) were intro-
duced. Changes in the SMIG swung the whole structure. In fact, wage de-
cisions made in any of the territories (the Ivory Coast, for example), were
inf luenced by employer and government representatives in Dakar (where the
government of the Federation of French West Africa was located) and in Paris.
Employer policies on wages and other labor matters were often set on a
broader basis than the territory, because of a concern with territorial
"whipsawing", whereby an increase granted on the territorial level could
become the target wage of unions in other territories; employer organizations
in each territory often had to clear with Paris before making final offers
in wage discussions in the Labor Advisory Commission or the Joint Councils.
With respect to conditions of employment, Paris played an even more
decisive role. For it was in Paris that the big legislative decisions were
made, such as in the substantive provisions of the Labor Code of 1952, which
applied to all the overseas territories of France. With respect to major
1
In 1956 two main changes were made. First, bargaining units more closely
modeled on the French pattern were introduced. These called for collective
agreement by "branch of activity" or industry group, rather than by whole
classes of workers as until 1956. Thus in 1956, the first two federal (FWA-
wide) collective agreements were signed--one for the construction industry
and the other for commercial firms. Agreements covering other industries
followed until 1958.
The second change introduced In 1956, was that agreements based on race
were abolished; the federal agreements set down conditions of work and wages
for all workers in the industry whatever their race.
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conditions of work, such as legal working hours, overtime rates and leave
provisions, it does not appear that major employers ever departed signifi-
cantly from the legal specified conditions.
All of this suggests a second major difference in the nature of the
industrial relations systems in the two areas, as evidenced in the collec-
tive bargaining process: The Gold Coast system was much more *indigenous",
or "inward-looking", involving essentially domestic considerations, while
the French West African arrangements were outward-oriented, embedded in
the colonial relationship. In the French areas, all the major issues, al-
most all of the substance of collective bargaining as well as the strategies
employed by the parties, derived from the colonial situation. As contrasted
with the Gold Coast system, where issues and strat'?gies were at once indi-
genous and universal (employer-employee conflicts of a familiar kind), the
French West African bargaining system was a unique offspring of the French
African colonial relationship.
In French West Africa, one general issue dominated collective bargain-
ing: equality of treatment of wage earners, and in particular equal pay
for equal work. Trade union demands were invariably focussed on the existence
of "unjustified" wage differentials--between African and French civil ser-
vants working in the African administrations; between workers in private
industry and workers in the public sector; between workers in one terri-
tory and workers in others within the Federation of French West Africa.
The essence of trade union strategy was a kind of generalized "whipsawing",
frequently using expatriate conditions as the lever or target.
The process is illustrated most dramatically in the Civil Service.
Public sector wage levels in France itself varied during this period with
4
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changes in the French consumer price index. An adjustment of civil servant
salaries in France was normally followed by a comparable adjustment of the
salaries of Frenchmen at work in the colonial territories in West Africa.
But these adjustments in Africa led to a widening of differentials between
Frenchmen and African civil servants doing comparable jobs, a situation which
generated insistent demands by African unions for equalizing increases. Up
to 1957, near the end of the colonial period, this procedure dominated dis-
cussions of civil servant salary policies and invariably led to increases
in African civil salaries.
The colonial government tried to settle the problem of equal pay for
equal work in the civil service in the Lamine Gueye Law of 1950, which set
down the principle of equal pay regardless of origin or race. But supplemen-
tary allowances and other fringe benefits differed between Frenchmen and
Africans, and the debate on wage policy throughout the 1950's was centered
1
on these differences in treatment.
Private sector employees had two "comparison groups". African civil
servants, who enjoyed better conditions, and European (French) workers in
private employment. Not only were demands for private sector wage increa-
ses generated by increases granted in the public sector, but equally favor-
able fringe benefits were sought and frequently won; thus family allow-
ances were introduced into the private sector after their existence in the
1--
For example, French civil servants in the highest cadre (Cadre General)
received a 40% hardship allowance on their base rate, while Africans--few
of whom were in this cadre, received 20% or 10%. The Frenchmen in Africa
benefitted from the French Code de Famille, and received roughly twice
as much in family allowances as an African civil servant under the local
regulations. (The differences are discussed in detail in a union newspa-
per, L'fiu-Frc uree #24, November 15, 1953).
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public sector had led to much agitation; and the higher rates of family
allowance payments in the public sector led to demands that there be equal
family allowances in private and public sector. Salary scales of white
workers, similarly, were an extremely useful lever, since the wage struc-
ture was differentiated between expatriates and Africans, and many of the
1
differences could not be easily defended.
In discussions over statutory minima a similar kind of whipsawing occurred.
Here the target was the narrowing of what can be called "the Dakar differential".
The SMIG in Senegal was always the highest in the Federation, and in terri-
tories other than Senegal It served as the reference point in bargaining
over minimum wages.
These examples suffice to illustrate the point: that the issues and
strategies of collective bargaining in French colonial Africa depended to
a unique extent on the special conditions of French colonial rule. The main
grievances sprang from the connection with France and the presence of French
administrators and wage earners in Africa. This was far less so in the Gold
Coast, or in British colonies generally. The issue of overseas allowances
for expatriates in the civil service did exist in the Gold Coast and was
a source of grievance, as were differences In leave provisions and other fringes.
1
For example, in retail and wholesale trade, at least until 1956, European
salary scales were based on seniority--i.e., according to number of tours
of duty--while African scales were graduated according to training and re-
sponsibility on the job. The lowest wage (including major fringe benefits
but excluding family allowances) paid to a Frenchman exceed the highest
African base rate in the collective agreements by over 30%. The rates were
minima; actual rates could be higher. But it was nonetheless a fact that
the rawest Frenchman with only a few exceptions received a higher salary than
the most skilled and seasoned African covered by the agreements. (See Annu-
aire Statistique de L'Afrique Occidentale Francaise, edition 1951, tome ii,
pp. 412, 413, 429, for collective agreement provisions and fringe benefits
as they existed in the early 1950's.)
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But the issue was faced squarely in the early 195 0's, insofar as the public
sector was concerned, and it did not arise again as a major source of orga-
nized protest in the public sector, nor was it an overwhelming issue in the
private sector. Into the public sector salary structure there was put an
"inducement" or overseas allowance, which was recognized to be necessary
to recruit expatriate civil servants and hence was limited to expatriates.
D. Strike Patterns
In certain basic respects, work stoppages in both the French areas
and the Gold Coast displayed common characteristics. Most work stoppages
in both areas, first of all, were short demonstrations, "quickies", lasting
one day or less; many of these were spontaneous in character--that is, not
organized by local union leaders. Thus, of the 30 work stoppages in French
West Africa in 1951, the majority were of this kind. The Inspector-General
of Labor wrote of them:
... their spontaneity was indicated, most often, hv the fact
that neither the managers of the enterprises nor the workers'dele-
gates, nor the responsible trade union leaders were infermed about
them beforehand....the strike have usually been violent manifesta-
tions of dissatisfactions....
1 - -
Inspection Generale du Travail de 1'A.0.F., Rapport Annuel, 1951, p. 16 8 . That
these continued to be the most common form of strike throughout the 1950's
is indicated by later figures for the Ivory Coast, where in 1957, 32 strikes
affected 5,800 workers for a total of 8,000 man-days lost, which indicates an
average duration of strikes of little over one day. (Inspection Territoriale
du Travail et des Lois Sociales de la Cote d'Ivoire, Rapport Annu1,Annee 1957,
(Tableaux #19, mimeographed).
In 1958 in Senegal, there were 29 stoppages, affecting 11,900 workers and
resulting in 78,100 man-days lost. Seven of these strikes were less than one
day in duration, seven for one day, twelve for less than six days and three
for more than six days. (Etat du Senegal, Inspection du Travail et des Lois
Sociales, Rapport Annuel, 1958, fasclcule #1 (mimeographed), p. 125). In the
Gold Coast, of the 57 disputes in 1957-1958, a typical year in this respect,
thirty-four were one day or less in duration, eleven were two to three days,
seven were from four to seven days, and only five were over a week long. (Ghana,
Annual Report on the Labour Division of the Ministry of Labour, Cooperatives
an oilWlar,15-98 Table K(a). )
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In both areas, too,most stoppages were limited to the workers of one
enterprise, and were--insofar as one can tell from the strike descriptions
contained in official reports--essentially "defensive" in nature; they were
the result of some action by management felt by the workers concerned to be
unnecessary or unjustified. These stoppages were really a method of airing
a grievance, or of initiating bargaining.1
Where differences in strike patterns appear most clearly is in the
character of big strikes. In the Gold Coast before 1958, there were three
large-scale strike movements. Two of them (in 1947 and in 1955-1956) were
long strikes in the mining industry, the third was the semi-general political
strike of 1950. In French Africa, the major strikes were sometimes on an
industry basis, such as the FWA railway strike of 1947-1948, which lasted
five months in some areas, but they generally tended to involve larger
blocks of workers, such as all government workers (Senegal, 1957 and Ivory
Coast in 1959), or all workers in the private sector (Senegal, 1957) and
frequently engaged the African wage earning community in general protest
demonstrations (1952 and 1953 stoppages throughout FWA). Major FWA union
efforts were thus not only broader in "coverage" than those in Ghana, but
were strikes against the government itself; a typical union effort was a
one or two day protest demonstration by most workers in a territory against
a government wage decision. The substantive issue in many of the general
or semi-general strike movements was often "equality" of treatment; this
was true for the railroad strike in 1947, and the private sector strike
in Senegal in 1957. There also occurred in FWA a kind of stoppage without
1
Analysis of strike histories given in Labor Department reports in the Gold
Coast between 1947 and 1959, Indicates that some 300 out of a total of al-
most 500 work stoppages during these years were "defensive" in this sense.
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counterpart in the Gold Coast: stoppages aimed at influencing labor
law-makers and those who applied the law at the local level. This type of
stoppage was common from 1952 to 1954, when the new Labor Code for the
Overseas Territories was being debated in France, and when it was later
applied in Africa.
II. Explanitory Factors
We have thus far described certain key characteristics of the industrial
relations systems of French West Africa and the Gold Coast, pointing out
similarities and especially differences in the two systems. The descrip-
tions are brief, often impressionistic, oversimplified. Importantaspects
of the industrial relations arrangements have been ignored. Differences have
probably been overstressed. It is nonetheless clear that the two patterns
are different. Trade union organizations in French Africa were mare involved
in politics, more gripped by ideology, spent less time and energy on union-
building and on local issues. Employer organizations were more plentiful,
more structured, more centralized in French Africa. Government played a
bigger role in determination of wages and conditions but exercised less
"guidance" over trade unions and their activities than in the Gold Coast.
The bargaining system was more centralized in French Africa, and the issues
which formed the substance of bargaining were more dependent on a colonial
presence than was the case in the Gold Coast. There was much spontaneous
striking in both areas, reflecting the slight development of grievance pro-
cedures and union control at the shop level; but organized disputes were
more frequently general in French Africa, were more concerned with the issues
of equal pay and conditions, and were more focussed against the government.
Any attempt to explain these different patterns is complicated by the
fact that in colonial situations whole institutional systems--in industrial
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relations as in other spheres--were introduced as part of colonial rule.
It is possible in these circumstances to regard colonial industrial relations
systems as simply little mirror images of metropolitan systems, distorted
here and there perhaps, but still essentially "French" or "British".
Now it ic obvious that the colonial inheritance has a great deal to do
with explaining why the industrial relations arrangements of French West
Africa and the Gold Coast developed as they did up to independence, and why
they evolved differently in the two areas. This is especially so in the
French areas, where the relevant institutions were more directly imported
and in greater detail. In British Africa the principle of "voluntarism"
in collective bargaining was reflected in labor law and in a greater diver-
sity in such matters as wage determination; there was therefore a greater
scope for indigenous adaptation.
But neither "the French system" nor "the British system" were absorbed
wholesale. A process of selection and adaptation took plalce, and African
conditions and needs determined which parts of the colonizers' industrial
relations institutions would be rejected or modified. Moreover, even to
the extent that most of the differences in patterns can be "explained" by
reference to the different colonial inheritances, it is still Important to
spell out the process involved; certain elements of the transferred insti-
tutions were especially critical in shaping the evolution of the system as
a whole, and these should be identified.
That there were "local options", so to speak, is illustrated by certain
aspects of trade union development. With respect to French Africa, there
was much in the local trade union situation that was familiar from French
trade unionism: the Ideological and political bent, the shaky presence of
4
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the unions at the shop level, the general indifference to financial matters
and the casualness of administrative structure. It could have been other-
wise in French Africa, however. The Christian and FO centrals, for example,
did tend to give higher priority to job-oriented issues and spoke the lan-
guage of "non-politicalness"; they offered significantly different orien-
tations than the CGT unions and their offshoots. Their audience, however,
was always limited; CGT unions, and unionists in the CGT tradition, remained
dominant throughout the colonial period.
In the Gold Coast, similarly, it is hardly an inherent characteristic
of "the British system" that the labor movement is "non-political"; yet in
the Gold Coast, relative "non-politicalness" was a fact for most of the
unions throughout most of the colonial period.
The evolution of trade union structure suggests even more clearly
that options existed and adaptations were made. The Gold Coast's unions
developed as small autonomous company unions, and where there was more than
one firm in an industry, no centralized industrial union developed, except
in mining. But it cannot be said that this occurred because unions in
Britain are this way. Not all of them are, and in fact, recent British
trade union history has seen the sharp reduction of number of unions, and
continual amalgamation into bigger units. The Gold Coast unions might just
as easily have developed along General Union lines and still remained within
"the British tradition". Elsewhere in the British Empire, in fact (Sierra
Leone and East Africa, for example) national unions were the dominant form.
It is the same with union structure in FWA. In France, the national
confederations are the center of power. In FWA the FWA-level organizations
were always weak; real power was in the hands of the geographical federations
4
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in each territory. Local unions and industrial federations were, for the
most part, paper organizations, sacrificed to the territorial federation.
In building this kind of union structure, African unionists in FWA often
ignored legal requirements as to trade union organization. For in French
Africa (as in France) the labor law said that only people who worked on
the same or related crafts or industries could join together in unions.
But the African trade union leadership in each city in FWA generally dis-
regarded this part of the law. Often they enrolled members directly into
the ranks of the geographical organization--the territorial federation--
even if they belonged to no local union. This was for a long time the
despair of French labor officers. But it was common practice.
It is necessary, then, to search for local factors and forces which
guided the process of institutional selection and adaptation and shaped
the development of the local industrial relations systems.
A. Trade Union Organization
Three related aspects of trade union organization will be considered:
the nature and extent of the political commitment; trade union structure;
and the intensity of institution-building or organization-oriented activities.
In the Gold Coast, a variety of factors "explain the distinctive charac-
teristics of the labor movement. An important element was the wage setting
mechanism, and in particular the fact that individual firms retained con-
siderable autonomy in fixing their wages and terms of employment. Despite
1
In 1950, the labor inspector of Guinea reported that the CGT in Guinea non-
sisted of a few regularly-constituted unions plus a mass of individuals who
were members only of the geographical federation. (Inspection Territoriale
du Travail de la Guinee Frangaise, RapotAne,15, p. 56). The Inspec-
tor General in 1951 of Labor commented on the generality of this phenomenon
and its undesirability. (Inspection Gen~rale du Travail de l'A.O.F.,
Rapport Annuel, '1951, p. 148.)
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the pattern-setting role of government, the locus of wage-making authority
in most of the private sector remained at the enterprise level. This en-
couraged union concentration at the enterprise level and the emergence
of a company-based or *house" unions as the key organizational unit.
This tendency was reinforced by other spects of the environment. In
an export economy, where there is in effect no internally competitive product
market, even in the nascent manufacturing sector, there are no significant
product market pressures inducing a larger scale of organization, either
among unions or employers. Nor was there any ideological impetus or a ge-
neral spirit of proselytizing which might have encouraged drives to organize
the unorganized and thus stimulate units of organization wider than the firm.
Though this was partly due to the scarcity of union leadership and funds,
it is also evident that there was little sense of mission among most Gold
Coast trade union leaders.
Administrative, organizational and regional factors further increased
the propensity to small scale organizations on the trade union side. Where
geographically scattered unions existed, central union headquarters were
1
frequently incapable of servicing the minimum needs of component units.
Slipshod accounting and mishandling of union funds led local union organiza-
tions to hesitate in sending money to higher echelon for fear it would be
mis-spent or misappropriated. Fast and loose use of union funds was in fact
a major plague. The secretary of the Regional Union of Agricultural Depart-
ment workers (Trans-Volta-Togoland Region), to take but one example, re-
f used to give up the union's accounts to a commission of inquiry of the
1
In their 1956 report to the Registrar of Trade Unions, the Patterson Zachonis
Employees Union, for example, noted that branches for some time refused to
send dues to headquarters in Accra because:..."We had no cooperation from Accra
since the last Annual Conference held in Accra in 1953; matters referred to
Accra had received no attention and our letters had not been replied to; the
HQ is not functioning and its administration has deteriorated."
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National Union of Agricultural Department Workers in 1956, and refused also
to give up the union funds in his possession. The amount was small (E12),
but the commission report noted that rank and file members refused to pay
1
dues as a result of this experience.
Administrative shortcomings and misuse of union funds aggravated centri-
fugal tendencies. They added to existing feelings of regional separateness
or ethnic differences, therby making amalgamation of unions harder and even
stimulating the dissolution along regional lines of such inter-regional
organizations as existed. The most troublesome region was Ashanti, where
general sentiment for separatism was greatest. In the mid-50's a number
2of Ashanti-based trade union branches broke away from larger organizations.
Finally there appears to have grown up a considerable amount of loyalty
to company or to craft. It was not easy to hold amalgamated unions together.
In the railway and harbor workers union, first railway enginemen, then mari-
time workers seceded because they felt the railway clerks were running the
union and that their interests were not taken into account. Between clerical
3
workers and manuals there were numerous signs of distrust. Leaders of strong
Joint Report of Inquiries into the Functions of the Trans-Volta Togoland
Regional Union of Agricultural Department Workers Unions, Appendix to Minutes
of the 7th Annual Delegates Conference of the Agricultural Department Workers
Union. August 4-5, 1956 (mimeographed). Other unions had similar problems.
(Cf., Report of Committee of Enquiry, the Obuasi Urban Council Employees Union,
(mimeographed, n.d., 1956 ).
2
Thus, the Kumasi Branch of the Agricultural Department Workers' Union broke
away from the national ADW union in 1957, and the Ashanti Branch of the Cad-
bury and Fry Employees' Union stopped sending its dues to headquarters after 1954.
3
Thus the constitution of the Elder Dempster Worker's Union provided for the
separate representation of clerical and manual workers; the Accra and Takor-
adi branches, for example, each sent three clerical workers and one artisan
to annual delegates' conferences. A number of unions broke up or fell into
inactivity at least in part because artisans felt that the white collar
leadership was not concerned with defending their interests.
4
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company unions argued that only workers in one company had the "sense
of oneness" necessary to cement a union together; they cited the failure of
the early (1947) Mercantile Workers' Union, which quickly fell apart.
Another set of explanatory facts is "political" in a broad sense, re-
lating to the creed or ideology of the colonial administrators, the policies
of the administration (which was partly the consequence of administrators'
ideology) and political forces within the Gold Coast. The Gold Coast co-
lonial administration, first of all, took a consistently hard line in sup-
port of "voluntarism", and this led to a legal framework which indirectly en-
couraged enterprise-wide unionism in a number of ways. Social legislation was
relatively sketchy, restricted largely to protective laws, and such conditions
of employment as were specified in the law were distinctly minimum (as against
"effective') conditions. Collective bargaining, conciliation and negotiation
were strongly encouraged, and direct government intervention in determination
of private sector wages and conditions was not common.
The law on trade unions probably encouraged the development of "house"
unionism in one special way: it permitted small groups of workers (five)
to form themselves into a trade union. This meant that employers could, if
they wanted to, easily disturb or break a union which was giving them
trouble, by stimulating separatist groups to form their own union. Dissident
groups within each union were also allowed to separate from the union when-
ever they suspected that their interests were not being advanced by the
1
It should be rememberd however, that half or more of the non-agricultural wage
earners in the economy were in public sector employment, throughout this period,
and government salary commissions did act as pattern setters.
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leadership of the union.1
British administrators and labor officers, finally, took a purist po-
sition on the desirability of non-political trade unionism, which they com-
bined with a devotion to "sound unionism"--i.e., well organized, well-ad-
ministered, self-supporting unions. It is easy to see why administrative
officers should have taken this position; it was in accord with their ge-
neral desire to avoid political disturbances along the carefully-laid path
they saw leading to full independence for the Cold Coast. But there is more
to it than this; political expediency does not explain, for example, why
representatives of the British labor movement, who were serving as labor
officers in the colonial government or as advisors to the African unions,
should have shared this dedication to non-politicalness and "sound" union
development. One factor may have been their recognition that their role
as technical assistance people could only be effective to the extent that
the Gold Coast unions were anxious to become "real" unions, not political
agencies. It also seems probable that they had an understanding of the
needs of basic institution-building, upon which their vision of "proper"
trade union development rested.
In addition to these "positive" factors there was an important negative
one: that the British administration in the Gold Coast would not hesitate
to repress forcefully any serious wandering from the non-political path. This
was how they reacted to the one political adventure of the Gold Coast unions,
1
Chanalan trade unionists, dissatisfied with their union structure in the
1950's, placed major emphasis on this legal framework in explaining the pre-
dominance of "house unionism". It undoubtedly played a role, but probably not
a major one. While there may have been some incitement to scission by em-
ployers, firm examples are hard to find and the fact that the law allowed
small numbers of workers to join in separate unions does not really explain
why they should have wanted to do so.
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the general strike of 1950, and the trade unionists knew they would react
the same way if a similar situation arose.
All of the above refer to attitudes and policies of British colonial
administrators. African political dynamics were also important in shaping
the Gold Coast system. The relationship between the Convention People's Par-
ty, which was the dominant nationalist party after 1949, and the trade
unions was quite complicated. Two aspects are relevant here: (1) the
biggest and best-organized unions (UOA.C. Workers Union, Public Works De-
partment Union, Mines Employees Union, most of the Railway Unions) were not
involved or interested in political affairs. (2) The CPP, in the early
1950s', tried to gain control of the unions and the labor movement as a
whole, by putting its people in control of the Trade Union Congress, and
shifting authority to the TUC. Throughout the 1950's therefore, most import-
ant unions were unwilling to give greater power to the TUC, because to do so
would involve control by the CPP. This was a major factor rendering the
TUC impotent until the situation was changed by law after independence (in
the Industrial Relations Act of 1958). It also helps explain why union lea-
ders so insistently argued that unions should be non-political, a view which
not only was a matter of conviction but congenial to their self-interest as
they saw it.
In explaingn the distinctive feature of French West African trade union
development, two factors are of major significance. The first is the peculiar
political context, the fact that the colonial relationship was illdefined, the
French committed morally and politically to an ideology of equal treatment
for Africans and Frenchmen, and the French metropolitan governments of the period
1
Cf., Berg and Butler, op ct
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weak and unstable. The general implications of this situation will be con-
sidered below; with respect to trade union development, it encouraged such
political propensities as existed in the unions, gave much potential poli-
tical bargaining power to the unions and made the equality issue an extremely
effective bargaining device. Even more basic is the fact that the political
context provided the raw material for conflict, so to speak. Because free
movement of people was one of the principles of the French Union, many
Frenchmen came to work in West Africa, including so-called petits-blancs,
men of the little skill or training, who competed with Africans for skilled
1
jobs and provided grist for the equality issue.
The second major factor was the method by which wages weredtermined.
Geographical bargaining meant that geographically-based union organization
was stimulated. That the basic unit of union sovereignty was the terri-
torial federation rather than the FWA-wide organizations is explained partly
by political factors--the territory rather than the federation was the pre-
dominant political unit--and partly by the fact that wage determination was
made on a territorial basis. Also, since government determined so much
of the wage structure and conditions of employment, what was most useful
was an agency capable of creating a political impression, one that could
call all the workers out for one or two day demonstrations.
1
The proportion of French wage earners in the wage labor force in FWA was far
greater than in the Gold Coast. In the mid-50's for example, there were
22,000 European wage earners in FWA out of a total recorded wage labor force
of some 350,000. Close to half of these European wage earners held middle
or lower level jobs--jobs normally requiring secondary school education or
below. (See E. Berg, "The Economic Basis of Political Choice In French West
Africa", American Political Science Review, June 1960, pp. 397-8). In the
Gold Coast in 1954 there was a total of 4,717 non-African wage and salary
earners in a total recorded wage labor force of 244,417. (Gold Coast,
Digest of Statistics, Vol.5, #ks 1 & 2, August 1956, p. 5.)
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The territorially-based general-type unionism which developed in response
to these conditions was not torn by the centrifugal forces so much in evi-
dence in the Gold Coast's unionism. Although clericl-manualdifferences
existed, and were in some territories given official recognition in separate
unions and collective agreements, they do not appear to have caused the
same intra-union conflict; the non-manual leadership 'of the unions seems
to have given rise to far fewer protests. Nor did administrative problems,
misuse of funds, or regionalist and ethnic separatism cause comparable strains.
The reasons for this are obscure; perhaps further research will someday
indicate that the same problems did in fact exist. But several possible
explanations can be suggested. One is the different role of ideology in the
two areas. As noted earlier, ideological elements were always more substan-
tial in FWA's unionism than in the Gold Coast's; socialism and Marxism of a
more serious and persistent kind was common gospel and this preachment of
the unity of the working class, especially in the colonial situation, may
have served to dilute separatist sentiment among wage earners. Secondly, since
union administration was not so absorbing an issue to French African unions
as it was in the Gold Coast, it was less likely to give rise to internal
controversy. Moreover, the greater role of government in wage determina-
tion and in fixing conditions of work and the greater centralization of
bargaining gave less scope for division on the basis of local particularisms.
And, finally the equality issue, around which so much of the bargaining
revolved, was undoubtedly a unifying force, since it involved general grie-
vances arising from the colonial situation.
B. EmployeiOranitio
Analysis of differences in employer organization can be dealt with more
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briefly. As a general rule, employers in most countries prefer to do their
own bargaining unless there are important economic or political forces
pushing them together. Thus, where many employers in one industry are facing
a strong industrial union, they may see that it is better for them to bargain
together; otherwise, the union can play off one against the other. Or where,
as in FWA, over-all rates of wages and conditions of work are bargained for
all workers in a given region, employers in that region must present common
proposals, and so are encouraged to join together.
In the Gold Coast there was no such stimulus to employers to bargain
together (except in the mining industry). There were, in fact, a number of
reasons for them to continue bargaining separately. Private firms still
retained considerable freedom to adjust their own wages and conditions of
employment and this freedom they preferred to keep rather than give it over
to a central bargaining agent in the form of an employers' association. As
with the unions, there were few competitive pressures in product or factor
markets which encouraged wider organization of employers, The disparate size
of firms was also a factor. Leading firms like the United Africa Company
felt it preferable to work out their own conditions on the grounds that they
had little to gain from joining with other employers,while smaller employ-
ers feared domination by the UAC.
A final factor was political. The main expatriate firms were reluctant
to engage in joint action with each other and with other employers partly
because the history of such joint action was bitter to many Africans and
evoked fears of imperialist conspiracy. The Association of West African
Merchants, and the import quota arrangement from which it benefitted in the
immediate post-war period, was one of the main elements in the Gold Coast,
disturbances of '1948. So, in order to avoid stirring old memories or new
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fears among Africans, many of whom tended to regard the expatriate firms as
part of the colonial apparatus, the larger employers--virtually all expa-
triates--shied away from employer organization. 1
In FWA, employers organized more widely and more readily. French employers
are more accustomed to joint negotiation than are British employers; there
were fewer political overtones in their organizing than in the Gold Coast and,
most important, the wage-setting mechanism in FWA was such as to encourage
them to organize. When they were consulted on the minimum wage, and when they
negotiated the wages of skilled workers, all employers bargained togeth3r
because all were directly affected by the outcome. There was also less reason
for major firms to be reluctant to bargain in common, since they had less
scope than did employers in the Gold Coast to determine their own conditions
of employment.
C. The Bargaining Pattern and the Role of Government
It was pointed out earlier that in French West Africa a system of cen-
tralized bargaining developed, organized on a geographical (territorial)
basis, with the issues dominating bargaining arising largely from the French
presence. In the Gold Coast collective bargaining was more decentralized,
more localized at the level of the firm, and more "indigenous" or general,
the issues and strategies being relatively independent of the particulari-
ties of the colonial situation. It was also shown that while government
in French West Africa was a more pervasive influence than in the Gold Coast,
more directly involved in the negotiation process, there was at the same
1
Symbolic of popular feeling~ and illustrative of the impact of the experience
with the Association of West African Merchants is the fact that at the Accra
race track, as late as 1958, the crowds would chant, "AWAM, AWAM," when they
suspected that a race was fixed.
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time less"guidance" of trade union development, less concern with the nur-
turing of "sound" trade unions as an end in itself. It was noted, finally,
that larger labor disputes in French Africa were almost invariably general
or semigeneral and directed against the administration itself, while this
occurred only once in the Gold Coast between the end of World War II and
the late 1950's.
In explaining these differences, it is quite clear that the different
colonial traditions are relevant. The importation of the French custom
of statutory minimum wage determination by region, with the statutory mini-
mum being not only an effective rate actually paid to large numbers of
workers, but also the key rate in the wage structure, was especially im-
portant' in shaping the French West African system. It was the same with
the highly articulated wage structure, which involved grouping all skilled
workers into six or seven broad categories, all in practice linked to the
SMIG. Other crucial elements of the system, such as permissiveness towards
civil servant participation in trade union affairs, also are in some measure
projections of the French system. Once these vital elements were intro-
duced, they exercised stronginfluence in shaping the rest of the system.
In the Gold Coast there was less of this kind of direct influence, be-
cause the British system is much less structured, and because no particular
set of wage determining institutions or approaches was *necessary", in the
sense that the adoption of French wage f Tixing instiLtutions was "necessary".
There were nonetheless, alternatives in French West Africa. If, for
example, wages had been determined on an all French West Africa basis, instead
of by territory, the structure of the labor movement and other major features
of the industrial relation system might have been different; more authority
would probably have gone to all French West Africa union bodies, for example,
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and also industrial unionism would have been stimulated. This was in fact,
beginning to happen after 1956, when industry-wide collective agreements
were negotiated. Why didn't the structure of bargaining take this form
from the beginning?
The territory became and remained the major unit of wage determination
because all parties concerned preferred it, and underlying these preferences
was the fact that the territories differed substantially in terms of income
levels. Thus for government, a French West Africa-wide minimum wage would
have been too rigid and would have risked forcing up wage levels in the
very poor territories of the interior. Employers wanted territorial wage
determination for the same reason, and because they recognized that the
risk of political concessions was greater the larger the scope of conflict.
The unions in the richer territories were not keen on federation-wide bargain-
ing because it would have restrained wages in their territories. There was
also a political factor of some importance: the French confederations, to
which the African unions were tied informally, favored territorially-based
unionism and bargaining because they feared the separatist tendencies mani-
fested from the early 1950's in French West Africa-wide organizations.
Differences in the political context, in the nature of the colonial
situation in the two areas, are basic to understanding the variations in
the two industrial relations systems. In the Gold Coast, the nature and
The French centrals explained their position in economic terms--that manage-
ment was too strong and well-organized on the federal level, and that nego-
tiations on the territorial level were likely to be more favorable, since
they presented opportunities for geographical "shipsawing"; the relatively
strong Senegalese unions, for example, could win an advance which the other
territories could then point to and demand. See, for a clear exposition
of this argument, Bulletin de Liaison des Travailleurs des Pays Coloniaux (Paris,
Mai, 1953), #33, pp. 4-5.
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outcome of the colonial relationship was never in doubt, nor after 1950
was there much uncertainty even about timing. It was clear to all concerned
that the Gold Coast would be independent, and soon; by 1951, the country
already enjoyed a fairly large degree of self-government.
French Africa, in contrast, lived under far greater uncertainty about
the character of its relationship to the metropole, about the ultimate
outcome of the relationship, and about the timing of change. The French
African territories had some political autonomy after 1945. But they
were not self-governing to any significant extent--certainly not comparable
to the Gold Coast after 1951--and constitutionally they were part of an
indissoluble French Union. They did not in principle have the right to
independence. It was not until 1956 that the word "independence" even came
out Into the open in general political discussion.
At the same time, the French colonial system was under fire throughout
the period under consideration here--first in Indo-China, then in North
Africa. And French governments at home were weak and unstable.
These specific differences in the political environment explain a great
deal about why the differences in the two industrial relations systems came
about. In all its dealings with African subjects, British administrators
in the Gold Coast could take the posture of high-minded trustees-holders
of a disinterested stewardship. They could therefore act with that ineffable
self-confidence which was so striking a feature of the British colonial style.
They could crush political strikes when they occurred. They could Insist on
developing "sound" unionism and properly functioning Institutions, In Indust-
rial relations as in other areas. In confrontations with Africans over
wage policy or other economic Issues, they could righteously defend the
long-term public Interest and demand "responsible" behavior on the part of
*
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trade unionists or other Africans.
French colonial adminstrators in West Africa enjoyed little of this
kind of luxury. They were notin a position to insist on the niceties of
institution-building, for example, even to the extent that they thought it
worthwhile. Nor were they able to make convincing appeals to economic
responsibility. The uncertainties of the political connection that bound
Africa and France, and the need to avoid social disturbances that might
raise questions about the nature of that connection, forced them into a
much more defensive position. Most important for them was the keeping of
the peace, particularly after disturbances began to spread in North Africa
in the early 1950's. The French administrators were caught in special con-
tradictions created by the doctrine and policy of equality between French-
men and Africans; on both moral and political grounds, they were thus vul*-
nerable to African trade union attack. Under these circumstances it was
extremely diffict'lt for French administrators to maintain a principled po-
sition and to avoid concessions, especially when any threats of social
disturbance arose.
These differences in colonial political environments can perhaps best
be summarized this way: the British colonial administrators, when faced
with demands or pressures by African trade unionists or other groups could
say: "This is your country, and you will soon be running it. What you
ask for is not in the general interest. Therefore we won't do it." Such
a posture was rarely possible for the French, largely because it was not
quite clear just whose country it was.
III. Conclusion: Environmental Change and Institutional Adaptation
In one sense, the industrial relations Institutions that emerged in
French Africa between World War II and the accession of French West Africa
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to independence around 1960 were especially "functional" or well-suited
to West African conditions. Trade union organizations and collective bar-
gaining relationships were in line with organizational needs and capa-
cities on the one hand, and in harmony with the structure of decision-
making power on the other. Few restrictions were put on civil servants
or other public employees in their trade union activities. Legal require-
ments regarding registration and financial reporting were ignored before
1952 and absent from the law after 1952. The attitude of government and
employers toward work stoppages was in general tolerant. The government
largely relieved trade unions of financial worries by the "detachment"
arrangement allowing civil servants to collect their pay and serve as
full-time union officials, and by the provision of office space at the
Bourse. There was relatively little insistence by government officials
or employers on the virtues of union self-sufficiency and solid organiza-
tions at the local level. All of this meant that the trade unions had
their hands free, so to speak, for the substantive Issues.
Union structure was similarly "functional". The vaguely delineated
organizational arrangements, with the emphasis on geographically-based
organizations, was an efficient adaptation to French African realities.
Given the small number of workers in any firm, industry, or even locality,
it allowed maximum use of union leadership and managerial skills and re-
duced the cost of union administration. At the same time it allowed the
unions to make the maximum Impact where and when It really counted: in
discussions with Government over changes In the level of the SMIG, and--
on occasion--for mobilization of general protest demonstrations to impress
either lawmakers in Paris or administrators In Dakar and the territorial
capitals with the "disturbance potential" involved in a given issue.
t
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Given the centralization of decision-making on labor matters, the
broad scope and coverage of legislation, the tendency for the SMIG to be
the effective rate for unskilled workers and to determine rates of change
of all wages, the existence of labor courts, a solicitous inspectorate of
labor and the delegues system--there seemed little to be done at the shop
level and hence not much point in building shop level institutions of any
strength.
From the point of view of the immediate interests of African wage earners
and even the African community as a whole, the system worked well. The trade
unions in French West Africa enjoyed a position of prominence in political
and economic affairs during these years; they were clearly in the mainstream
of events in most of the territories, despite union poverty, small member-
ship, the absence of firm organizational roots among the rank and file,
and other disabilities. In some of the territories (Guinea and Niger, especial-
ly) they provided top political leadership. They were in all territories
significant agents of decolonization, their persistent demands for full
equality of treatment being particularly effective in laying bare the In-
herent contradictions of the post-war colonial system.
On the economic side, the trade unions and the peculiarities of the
bargaining system led to a higher level of real wages, especially in the
public sector and the poorer territories, than would otherwise have pre-
vailed, and to conditions of work and wages which were considerably better
than those in neighboring countries. Major conditions of work for wage
earners in French Africa (vacations, hours, etc.) were more favorable than
those in more developed and richer African countries. Real wage levels in
general increased throughout the period under consideration, despite many
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years of sharply rising price levels. The cost of these income gains,
moreover, was to a considerable extent financed by metropolitan French-
men, so that the gains to African wage earners did not involve African
rural-urban conflict of interests to the extent that it might have other-
wise.
In the Gold Coast it was different. In many respects the policies
and institutions that evolved during this same period seemed out if joint,
unsuitable to local needs and possibilities. The unions, for example,
never had more than a marginal impact in p olitical or economic terms.
They were for the most part half-formed institutions, weak, divided, small,
poor, preoccupied-- pathetically it sometimes seemed--with the forms of trade
unionism rather than the substance, developing organizational machinery,
laboring over account books, sitting in consultative and negotiating bodies
which dealt only with minor issues of the workplace. They never came to
grips with the fact that big advances might have been possible through le-
gislative or administrative channels, which is to say through political
action.
Judged by their serviceability to African wage earners and their adap-
tation to local possibilities and local power structures, the industrial
relations institutions of the Gold Coast were thus less"functional" or "suit-
able" than those in French West Africa. But this is not the whole story.
From a longer term point of view, and when account is taken of the adapta-
bility of the two systems to conditions of independence, a different judge-
Cf., E. Berg, "Real Income Trends in West Africa, 1939-1960", in M. Herskovits
and M. Harwitz, Economic Transition in Africa, (Evanston, 1964).
2
Direct recurrent budget subsidies, payment of wages of some African civil
servants, financing of investment expenditures, and support of prices of French
West African exports at higher than world prices were the forms by which




ment is called for. For the French West African system could not survive
in recognizable form once colonial rule ended. It was too "specialized",
too dependent on the peculiar features of the colonial environment at a
particular phase of colonial rule: a Government unwilling to risk politi-
cal disturbance and hence anxious to buy off potential trouble; an economic
system such that normal restraints on wage increases were to an important
extent removed by provision of French subsidies; a bargaining system in
which the main issues were generated by the colonial presence (inequalities
between Frenchmen and Africans in wage employment), and in which conflict
centered on the demand for equality; a set of ground rules that allowed
strikes against the state and imposed few penalties for strikes in general;
a political framework and an ideology sanctioning free association, free
collective bargaining and political and economic equality. With independence,
all of these elements of the environment were transformed, and the whole
institutional underpinning of the system crumbled. Independence, for exam--
ple, removed almost entirely the political and moral force behind demands
for equality of treatment between expatriates and locals, and therefore
stripped from the unions their main weapon and removed from the bargaining
system what had been its main concern. Independence also brought the new
states face-to-face with the budget effects of wages policy, which, combined
with an awareness of their political fragility, led them to take a far less
genial view of strikes than had the colonial administration--particularly
strikes of civil servants and semi-general protest demonstrations of the kind
common earlier. They didn't hesitate therefore to forbid such strikes, re-
quisition strikers when they occurred, and even fire strikers--an act almost
without precedence in the earlier period. They could--and did--decapitate
union leadership ,by changing the practice of civil servant de tachment for
L
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union duty. And they didn't hesitate to jail unionists, freeze wages, and--
in the new labor legislation that followed independence--severely control
union activity. The trade unions, with in effect nothing to do, were
thrown into almost total disarray. In most of French-speaking West Africa,
independence brought into being state-dominated trade unions serving mainly
ceremonial functions, and the withering of genuine bargaining.
The colonial system was "disfunctional" in another sense. It led to
levels of wages and salaries which were "too high", in the sense that they
severely constrained possibilities for local financing of public sector
development expenditures. One consequence of this was that the problems of
independence were exacerbated by the need to deflate real wage levels in
French Africa. Since the late 1950's money wages have risen very little in
most of the states of former French West Africa. At the same time, price
levels have risen by at least 4 per cent annually in most of these states.
So real wages have been sharply cut, and in some places (Dahomey and Upper
Volta, for example) civil service salaries hate been reduced in money terms
as well. This brutal confrontation with economic reality, which was post-
poned during the colonial period because the appeal by the French for "respon-
sibility" was always countered by the African appeal to "Justice" and "Equa-
lity", has been a basic source of political and social instability through-
out the French-speaking areas, and particularly in the poorer territories
of Dahomey and Upper Volta.
In Ghana also, Independence brought dramatic changes. Full government
and party control over the unions was Imposed by the Industrial Relations Act
of 1958, and "Independent" trade unions disappeared. Strikes and other union
activities were closely regulated, and the unions were fully absorbed Into
the machinery of the governing party. In much of the public sector the
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negotiation and consultation machinery fell into disuse. But what is most
striking is the extent to which the system xhichdeveloped under Colnial rule
persisted, throughout the N'krumah regime and up to the present. Before
the 1966 coup which ousted N'krumah, the trade unions continued to spend much
of their energy on institution building, on perfecting their organizational
machinery, on job-oriented issues. In the private sector, negotiations
and discussions went on much as before. And despite the change at the top,
with the newly-dominant TUC playing a major role as political and ideolo-
gical agent of the party, most of the trade union officials at the lower
levels continued to work at negotiations with employers, grievance handling,
and similar matters. In part this was due to institutional inertia and to the
fact that there was not much else that could be done. But it suggests that
precisely because the Gold Coast system gave priority to local matters, and
because of the efforts to construct genuine trade union machinery and en-
gage in genuine bargaining with employers, the inherited institugions were
able to survive more recognizably. Unlike the French West African arrangements,
the Gold Coast system did not depend on particular characteristics of the
colonial regime, except in certain respects (the degree of "autonomy", or
independence from government); it was more "general,", based morc solidly on
universal and persistent problems arising out of the relationship between
employers and the employed.
There is another point relevant to any evaluation of the "suitability"
of the Industrial relations institutions transferred to West Africa under
colonial rule.
The modernization process involves Institution-building in a fundamental
sense, It involves the emergence of organizations and procedures that can




group demands, widen the area of participation in decisions and presumably
thereby make for better definition and resolution of problems. It involves
also the development of organizational competence and effectiveness.
There is not much doubt that the industrial relations institutions and
policies of the Gold Coast involved more"institutional development" in this
sense than did those in French West Africa. It involved relativcly more
people in dealing with problems of a more basic and enduring kind, and
taught them more about the complex task of administering organizations and
resolving problems. It created an institutional base, a set of established
procedures and habits of mind which (though it was neither large nor firmly
rooted) could grow and develop. In this sense the colotial industrial re-
lations experience had a broader modernizing impact in the Gold Coast than
in French Africa, and this is probably the most important criterion of all
in evaluating any set of Institutions in modernizing countries.
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